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Abstract
Theories including a collapse mechanism have been presented various years ago.
They are based on a modification of standard quantum mechanics in which nonlin-
ear and stochastic terms are added to the evolution equation. Their principal merits
derive from the fact that they are mathematically precise schemes accounting, on
the basis of a unique universal dynamical principle, both for the quantum behav-
ior of microscopic systems as well as for the reduction associated to measurement
processes and for the classical behavior of macroscopic objects. Since such theories
qualify themselves not as new interpretations but as modifications of the standard
theory they can be, in principle, tested against quantum mechanics. Recently, var-
ious investigations identifying possible crucial test have been discussed. In spite of
the extreme difficulty to perform such tests it seems that recent technological de-
velopments allow at least to put precise limits on the parameters characterizing the
modifications of the evolution equation. Here we will simply mention some of the
recent investigations in this direction, while we will mainly concentrate our atten-
tion to the way in which collapse theories account for definite perceptual process.
The differences between the case of reductions induced by perceptions and those
related to measurement procedures by means of standard macroscopic devices will
be discussed. On this basis, we suggest a precise experimental test of collapse the-
ories involving conscious observers. We make plausible, by discussing in detail a
toy model, that the modified dynamics can give rise to quite small but systematic
errors in the visual perceptual process.
1 A concise review of the measurement problem
As is well known the paradigmatic case in which an embarrassing situation emerges within
a quantum scenario is the macro-objectification or measurement problem. It can be
summarized by resorting to the idealized scheme proposed by von Neumann [1].
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We consider a microscopic system smicro, we assume that it has been prepared in
the eigenstate |ωi〉 of an appropriate observable Ω, and we suppose to be interested in
determining the value of this observable by a measurement process. We then consider
a macroscopic apparatus Smacro prepared in its “ready” state |S0〉 and we switch on a
system-apparatus interaction inducing, in the time span in which the measurement takes
place, the process summarized by the second of the following equations:
Ω|ωi〉 = ωi|ωi〉 (1)
|ωi〉 ⊗ |S0〉 → |ωi〉 ⊗ |Si〉, (2)
where we have denoted as |Si〉 the orthogonal final states of the apparatus which are
assumed to correspond to mutually exclusive perceptions of a conscious observer looking,
e.g., to the “pointer position” of the apparatus.
Then, if we trigger the apparatus with a state which is a superposition of different
eigenvectors of Ω, the linear nature of quantum mechanics implies the following evolution
for the system-apparatus system:
[
∑
i
ci|ωi〉]⊗ |S0〉 →
∑
i
ci|ωi〉 ⊗ |Si〉. (3)
Equation (3) shows clearly that the system and the apparatus are now entangled, and,
in particular, that the apparatus cannot be claimed to possess a precise macro property
associated to our definite perceptions when we look at it.1
We consider it appropriate to close this section by the sharp statement by J. Bell:
Nobody knows what quantum mechanics says exactly about any situation, for
nobody knows where the boundary really is between wavy quantum systems and
the world of particular events.
2 Some proposed solutions which do not alter the
quantum predictions
We list and briefly comment here some of the most popular proposals to overcome the
just mentioned problem, proposals which, however, fully agree with quantum predictions
for what concerns the outcomes of measurement processes.
• Incompleteness. The state is not everything. This way out of the macro-objectification
problem considers the quantum specification of the state of a physical system, given
by the statevector, as not complete: to have an exhaustive description one has
1It has to be stressed that the unacceptable situation we have just mentioned does not derive from the
fact that we have resorted to the (extremely) idealized description of von Neumann of the measurement
process. Actually, as it has been proved recently [2], the very requirement that one can ascertain a
micro property with a reasonable degree of reliability together with the assumption of the universal linear
character of the evolution, implies that superpositions of macroscopically and perceptively distinguishable
states unavoidably occur.
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to add to the statevector further variables, whose knowledge would allow a more
detailed specification of the objective situation of individual physical systems and
would consent more accurate or even fully precise predictions of the outcomes of
measurement processes. The paradigmatic example of this position is the de Broglie-
Bohm theory, which, in recent years, has seen an impressive set of mathematical
investigations aimed to clarify the most delicate points of the theory2. The ensuing
formal scheme is completely satisfactory, it represents a deterministic completion
of the theory based on the addition to the state vector of the so called “hidden
variables”, which are identified with the positions of all particles of the system, and
which are, in principle, unaccessible. The theory is logically consistent and, in our
opinion, it represents an extremely interesting theoretical scheme which overcomes
the foundational problems of the theory.
• Limiting observability or invoking deoherence. This perspective has many facets,
as one can see by taking into account the positions of Jauch [4], Daneri et al [5],
Joos and Zeh [6] and Zurek [7], among others. The philosophy which characterizes
it is extremely simple: either in principle (Jauch, Daneri) or for practical reasons
(Joos & Zeh, Zurek) one cannot find a way to put into evidence that superpositions
of macroscopically and perceptibly different situations actually occur. There are
two fundamental objections which can be raised against this position: one derives
from remarking that it never happened, in the history of science, that a theory
leads to a nonsensical (in the sense of not matching our perceptions) situation - the
superposition of perceptibly different states - but, at the same time, that resorting to
an approximation one gets an acceptable picture of natural phenomena. Secondly,
as remarked, among many others, by S. Adler [8], the decoherence approach has
not solved the measurement problem, this statement following from the well known
fact that the correspondence physical ensembles → statistical operators is infinitely
many to one in quantum mechanics, so that, as recognized even by the strongest
supporters of the decoherence approach [6]:
no unitary treatment of the time dependence can explain while only one
of these dynamically independent components is experienced.
According to these authors the emergence of our definite perceptions might depend
on our local way of perceiving, a totally unacceptable position, in our opinion, due
to the central role which it attributes to the conscious observer.
• Enriching Reality. We have decided to use this term to identify both the Many
Worlds [9, 10] as well as the Many Minds [11] interpretations. In the first case,
it is assumed that when one reaches the macro level and superpositions of macro-
scopically and perceptibly different states occur, the universe multifurcates, so that
there are many universes in which all different macro situations become actual, one
of them for each different universe. The second attitude corresponds to assuming
the same not for the actual occurrence of different situations, but for the occurrence
2For an exhaustve and lucid discussn of the De Broglie Bohm theory we refer the reader to the book
[3]
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of all potentially possible perceptions: our brains are built in such a way that there
are different “sheets” registering different perceptions, the different sheets of differ-
ent observers having to be synchronized among themselves in such a way that no
intersubjective disagreement might occur.
At this point we consider it interesting to present the completely different position of
the adherents to the collapse view of natural processes.
3 Collapse Theories
The central idea of this approach consists in contemplating that the linear and determin-
istic evolution of the standard theory has not a universal validity: the basic Scro¨dinger’s
equation must be modified by the addition of nonlinear and stochastic terms, which ac-
count for the definite features of the reduction process.
As it is obvious, and as it has been stressed by many scientists, macro-objects are
characterized by the fact that they correspond to perceptually different locations of (some)
of their macroscopic parts (typically their “pointer”), so that it is quite natural to tackle
“the preferred basis problems” by assuming that the modified dynamics strives to make
precise the positions of physical objects. Given this, we can be fully precise about the
features of collapse models. For simplicity we will make reference to the original proposal
of ref.[12].
• States. A Hilbert space H is associated to any physical system and the state of the
system at time t is represented by a normalized vector |ψt〉 of H.
• Dynamics. The evolution of the system is governed by Schro¨dinger’s equation. In
addition, at random times, with a Poissonian distribution with mean frequency λ
(which is assumed to be proportional to the mass of the particle under considera-
tion), each particle of any system is subjected to a spontaneous localization process
of the form:
|ψt〉 → Ln(x)|ψt〉||Ln(x)|ψt〉|| ; Ln(x) = (
α
π
)3/4 exp[−α
2
(xˆn − x)2]. (4)
In this equation xˆn is the position operator of the n− th particle of the system.
• Collapse probability. One assumes that the probability density that the collapse for
the n− th particle occurs at the space point x is given by:
pn(x) = ||Ln(x)|ψt||2. (5)
• Ontology. Let ψt(x1, .....xN) be the wave function in configuration space. Then:
m(x, t) ≡
N∑
n=1
mn
∫
d3x1...d
3x1Nδ
(3)(xn − x)|ψt(x1, .....xN)|2, (6)
is assumed to describe the density of mass distribution of the system of the N
particles under consideration in three-dimensional space as a function of time.
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• The trigger mechanism. The nicest feature of the model consists in the fact that
the localizations increase with the number of particles. In particular, it can be
rigorously proved that any localization of any particle implies a localization of the
centre of mass of the whole system. Accordingly, in the case of an almost rigid body,
its position suffers a localization with a frequency amplified, with respect to the one
of the individual constituents, by the number of the constituents of the body.
• Choosing the parameters of the theory. The original choice [12] of the values of the
localization accuracy and of the mean frequency of the localization for a nucleon
has been:
λ ≃ 10−16sec−1, α ≃ 1010cm−2. (7)
Note that with these choices a microscopic system suffers a localization about every
107years, while a macroscopic system (N ≃ 1023) one about every 10−7 sec. This
is why the standard theory is left practically unchanged at the micro-level, while
superpositions of macroscopically distinct states are suppressed in extremely short
times.
Some important remarks:
• The physics depends essentially only on the product αλ with the only proviso that
the localization accuracy must be much larger than the atomic dimensions in order
that the modified dynamics leaves practically unaffected the internal motion.
• Changing the above product of some orders of magnitude contradicts well estab-
lished facts or it requires some important modification like the introduction of an
appropriate cut-off.
• The theory qualifies itself as a rival theory with respect to quantum mechanics
and can be subjected to crucial tests with respect to this theory. Moreover, if one
takes it seriously, one can get from it indications concerning where to look for an
hypothetical breaking of the superposition principle.
• Recently a lot of attention has been paid to the possibility of devising crucial ex-
perimental tests of the theory against quantum mechanics. These tests cover a wide
range of experimental situations. We will mention those making reference to the
fact that the collapse processes tend to destroy quantum interference (the problem
has been discussed in ref.[13, 14, 15]). Other interesting effects follow from the fact
that the collapse models imply spontaneous photon emission (see ref.[16, 17, 18]),
as well as from the fact that energy is not conserved (see ref. [12, 23]). For a general
review of the problem of testing collapse models we refer the reader to [19].
4 The problem of definite perceptions within collapse
models
In 1989, Albert and Vaidman [20] have raised an important issue concerning the implica-
tions of collapse models with respect to the perceptual process itself. The challenge can
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Figure 1: The Albert and Vaidman proposal
be easily formulated: one has a neutral atom of spin 1/2 in the spin state corresponding
to σx = +1, which traverses a region in which an inhomogeneous magnetic field (along
the z-direction, orthogonal to x and to the propagation direction y) generated by a Stern-
Gerlach device is present. As we all know, quantum mechanics predicts that the state of
the atom, after the region of the apparatus has been traversed, is the equal weights super-
position of its being deflected upwards and deflected downwards. On the considered paths
one puts a fluorescent screen with the following properties: when the screen is hit by the
impinging atom, a relatively small number of its atoms (of the order of ten) are excited,
the excited states having an extremely short life time, so, immediately after the hitting,
we have a superposition of two states |10 photons from A〉 and |10 photons from B〉, a
notation to denote that the photons originate, in the first case, from a point A, and in the
second case, from a point B of the screen. The experimental set up is depicted in Fig.[1].
The argument goes then as follows:
• In the time interval before the photons reach the eye, the collapse dynamics, due
to the small number of particles involved and due to the fact that collapses do not
involve photons, is not able to induce a collapse, so that we actually have the linear
superposition (1/
√
2)[|10 photons from A > +|10 photons from B >]. We assume
that one can test, by an interference experiment, that the superposition is actually
there.
• Now we call into play a perceiving observer who looks at the screen to check whether
he sees a spot from the point A or from the point B. Since the threshold for visual
perceptions is of the order of 5-7 photons, one is led to conclude that the observer
will have a definite perception concerning the point in which there is a luminous
spot.
• The conclusion follows: in the considered situation it is the conscious act of per-
ception of the observer which determines the actual outcome, i.e. it induces the
“reduction” of the “superposition” of two different and incompatible perceptions to
only one of them.
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This point of view has been subsequently stressed by Albert himself [21] in his inter-
esting book: Quantum Mechanics and Experience:
Suppose we want to stick with the GRW theory anyway. What would that
entail? ... Well, we would have to deny that the measurement described above
is over even once a recording exists. We would have to insist (and certainly this
is an ineluctable fact, when you come right down to it) that no measurement
is absolutely over, no measurement absolutely requires an outcome, until there
is a “sentient observer” who is actually aware of that outcome.
The inappropriateness of this statement should be clear to anybody. There is no doubt
that, within collapse theories, any (non human) detector aimed to check whether there
is a spot at A or there a spot at B (e.g., the firing of one of two Geiger counters located
along the paths of the emitted photons, or even an apparatus such that its triggering
by the superposition would put it - in the quantum description - in the superposition of
having its pointer pointing to “From A” or “From B”), would imply a reduction of the
state. No conscious observer is necessary in collapse models. However, the argument of
ref.[20] undoubtedly represents an extremely serious and important challenge to collapse
theories, a challenge we accepted to face.
Shortly after the appearance of Ref.[20], Aicardi, Borsellino, Ghirardi and Grassi ana-
lyzed [22] the perceptual process adopting precisely the point of view of collapse theories
3 .
The perceptual process involves the following steps:
• Transmission of the stimulus from the rods of the retina to the lateral geniculate
body and from this to the higher visual cortex, the transmission of the nervous
signals taking place along the axons connecting the various regions.
• The transmission mechanism implies the passage of Na and K ions from the internal
to the external region of the axon through the Ranvier nodes. The axon is coated
by the myelin sheet, which is precisely 10−5cm thick (the characteristic reduction
distance of the collapse models).
• If one takes seriously this line and assumes a very prudent attitude about the number
of particles involved, it turns out that the process involves, just within perceptual
times, the displacement of a sufficient number of particles in order that the collapse
mechanism become effective: one of the two nervous signals is suppressed and a
definite perception emerges.
5 Have the parameters of collapse theories been ap-
propriately chosen?
As we have discussed in the previous section, if one makes the choices (7) for the pa-
rameters of the model under considerations, one can show that macroscopic measurement
3Borsellino has been the first and most prominent representative of neurophysicists in Italy.
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processes have outcomes and conscious observers have definite perceptions, even when
the perceptual process is triggered by a genuine quantum superposition and no apparatus
enters into play. However, as we have just mentioned, in ref.[22], in order to account for
conscious perceptions, the whole process of nervous transmission in the brain has been
taken into account. This fact does not seem fully satisfactory to some authors, and has
been challenged, e.g., by S. Adler [23]. He perfectly agrees on the fact that collapse
theories, when few particles are involved, turn out to make predictions in full agreement
with those of standard quantum mechanics, as well as on the fact that one must require
that when one reaches the macroscopic level, linear superpositions must be suppressed.
However, there is a mesoscopic region (from the point of view of the number of involved
particles) about which there might be some disagreement. Typically, as already indicated,
S. Adler is not fully satisfied with the fact that the whole process of nervous transmis-
sion is necessary in order that the collapse takes place, and suggests that reduction must
already take place when the rods of the eye register the signal.
Another fact should be mentioned. In the formulation we have adopted, collapse
theories are not able to consistently deal with systems containing identical constituents,
because collapses do not respect the (anti)symmetry requirements for such constituents.
This requires a modification of the formalism and a quite nice reformulation of the original
theory which solves this problem has been worked out by Pearle [24] and by Pearle et
al. [25]. However, taking into account the identity of the elementary constituents, the
efficiency of the trigger mechanism is increased4. Without entering into the details of
the mathematical analysis we summarize the general situation: the localization accuracy
1/
√
α cannot be decreased without inducing unacceptable effects, so, the game we can
play is entirely related to possible changes of the mean frequency λ of the localizations.
The ensuing situation is the following:
• The choice for λ made in the original collapse model [12] leads to the classical behav-
ior of system with more than 1013 particles, while there is a continuous transition
to a complete quantum behaviour for numbers appreciably smaller than this. In
particular when only 104−105 particles are involved, the behaviour is certainly still
quantum.
• On the other hand, if one pretends, with Adler, the collapse to occur at the level of
rods, in which case the displacement of a number of particles of the just indicated
order is involved, one must appreciably increase the value of λ. As discussed by
Adler a choice 108 times greater than the original one is perfectly able to induce
the collapse in the time in which the rearrangement of the constituents in the rod
takes place. Accordingly, Adler suggest to choose for λ the value λ ≃ 10−8±2sec−1.
This request, however, implies a too fast increase of the energy of the universe due
to collapses and, as a consequence, it requires some modifications which alter the
original simplicity of the theory.
At any rate, the present analysis is useful to point out an essential fact which distin-
guishes the case of collapses due, typically, to superpositions of different positions of a
4We refer the reader to Ref.[2] for a detailed discussion of this problem.
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macroscopic body from those taking place when our apparatus is triggered by a micro
superposition whose states induce directly different perceptions. We discuss this point in
the next section.
6 A comparison of the characteristic times of the
hamiltonian evolution and of the reduction pro-
cesses
Just to give an idea of the situation, let us take first of all into account a free macroscopic
system, like a pointer of 1gr, initially in a state with a spread of the c.o.m. position of
the order of 10−5 cm. If we want to get an idea of the changes induced in the statevector
by the hamiltonian evolution, a good estimate is given by the time it takes to double its
spread, or (considering a physically more meaningful spread) to reach a spread of 10−1
cm, which we assume to be smaller than the separation of the pointer positions related
to the different outcomes in the measurement. This computation leads to the conclusion
that, during the time in which the hamiltonian evolution changes appreciably the state
of the object, it suffers, according to the original choice of the parameters, from 1025 to
1029 localizations. In the case considered by Adler, these numbers have to be amplified
of a factor 108.
On the contrary, for what concerns the perceptual process, when the perceptual ap-
paratus is triggered by a superposition of microscopically different states (photons from
A or from B), both in the original as well as in Adler’s case, the reduction takes place
just in the relevant times, i.e. the perceptual ones, during which the statevector changes
from the superposition to one of its terms. And here a new feature emerges. Important
differences in the dynamics occur when the two processes, the hamiltonian evolution and
the changes induced by the localizations, become competitive, with respect to the case in
which the localizations are enormously more frequent that the time required by hamilto-
nian changes. We will make clear this point by discussing, in the next section, a specific
toy model (which has nothing to do with perceptions) in which we have a competition of
the hamiltonian evolution and the reduction process. The study of this case is interesting
because it allows to make plausible that collapse models might have consequences on the
unfolding of the perceptual process.
Actually, the arguments we will present have already been outlined in a paper [26]
by one of us. However, the treatment of ref.[26] was rather qualitative. The real novelty
consists in the fact that here we will present rigorous results supporting the proposal.
7 A toy model making plausible that collapse models
can be tested in perceptual experiments
In this section, motivated by the considerations of the previous one, we will discuss in
detail a toy model, characterized by an hamiltonian evolution and by a collapse process
which can be considered as competing. The aim is to check whether under such conditions
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some interesting effects might arise. The toy model we will consider has nothing to do with
actual processes triggering different perceptions, and is a trivial two dimensional example,
the two possible states in which the collapse strives to drive the statevector mimicking,
in a sense, the two possible perceptions in an experiment of the kind presented in ref.[20].
Here is the model. We have a spin 1/2 particle evolving according to Schro¨dinger’s
equation with the hamiltonian:
H = h¯ω
(
0 1
1 0
)
, (8)
and subjected, with mean frequency λ, to reduction processes on the eigenstates of σz .
We assume that the initial state of the system is:
ψ(0) =
(
a
ib
)
, (9)
where a and b are real numbers that we choose to take the values5
a =
√
0.48, b =
√
0.52. (10)
Let us write the statistical operator at time t in the following form:
ρ(t) =
(
ρ1(t) ρ3(t)
ρ∗3(t) (1− ρ1(t))
)
, (11)
and let us call:
P+ =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, P− =
(
0 1
0 0
)
, (12)
the projection operators on the eigenstates of σz belonging to the eigenvalues +1 and −1,
respectively.
The quantum dynamical semigroup equation for the statistical operator is then:
dρ(t)
dt
= − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)] + λP+ρ(t)P+ + λP−ρ(t)P− − λρ(t). (13)
Note that the time which is necessary in order that the quantum evolution induces
appreciable changes of the statevector (e.g. the time in which the spin makes a complete
rotation around the z-axis) is τ = π/2ω, while the characteristic time between two reduc-
tion processes is 1/λ. Since we want the reduction to occur within times of the order of
the perceptual times, we will choose λ = 102sec−1. The parameter determining the ratio
of the inverses of the times of the unitary evolution and of the reductions will be denoted
as ǫ = ω/λ.
With reference to the expression (11) of the statistical operator we call the attention
of the reader on the fact that ρ1(t) gives the probability that, at time t, the spin is in the
5We have made a 6= b because the effects we are going to analyze depend on the initial state and the
choice we have made turns out to be particularly appropriate for the emergence of the discrepancies we
are interested in.
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state corresponding to σz = +1, while the vanishing of ρ3(t) tells us that reduction has
actually taken place. In fact, in the present model it is obvious that reductions take place
at the individual level, so that, here, it is legitimate to study the collapse process looking
only at the statistical operator.
We analyze now in detail the evolution of the statistical operator for 2 quite different
values of ǫ. First of all, to mimik the typical situation of realistic collapse models, we
make the reductions much more frequent than the time in which the hamiltonian changes
appreciably the statevector by choosing ǫ = 10−6, so that one million reductions occur
during the time in which a rotation of 2π of the spin is caused by the hamiltonian.
Alternatively we will consider the case in which ǫ = 10−2, corresponding to a much
smaller number of reductions (≃ 100) during the same time.
7.1 A remark concerning the asymptotic behavior
In realistic collapse theories and in the case of a macroscopic body in a superposition of
macroscopically different states the time evolution goes as follows:
• In times of the order of λ−1macro ≃ 10−7sec the reduction process takes actually place
leading to one of the two superposed states with the correct quantum probabilities.
• Subsequently, the statevector remains, for an incredibly long time (many times the
age of the universe), the one to which the reduction process has led.
• However, asymptotically, i.e. for t→ +∞, the statevector changes and it does not
tend to a precise limit. This is a mathematical fact which has no physical relevance.
The situation is rather different in the case we are discussing, i.e. when one has an
equation of the quantum dynamical semigroup type which admits a steady solution. In
such a case a completely general theorem asserts that any solution must tend to it when
t → ∞. Our model manifestly exhibits the steady solution ρ(t) = (1/2)I. This implies
that the unfolding of the evolution process takes place in this way:
• The reduction time is characterized essentially, as before, by λ−1.
• Subsequently, reduction takes place to one of the superposed states with a proba-
bility depending on the initial state and it lasts for a certain period.
• However, at a certain time a new regime occurs, since, as we have stressed, the
statistical operator must take the form ρ(t) = (1/2)I. It is important to have
clear that what really matters is the second step, i.e. the detailed features of the
reduction process and the time for which it lasts. In fact, here we are dealing with
a toy example, mimicking only a very small part of the real process. Actually,
if reduction takes place and lasts even for a short (but long with respect to the
perceptual times) period, the very reduction process, i.e. the actual emergence of a
definite perception, triggers other changes involving an extremely large number of
particles. For instance other parts of the brain are surely involved besides the axons
which have transmitted the signal, or, just to make a trivial example, we might
11
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Figure 2: The behavior of the statistical operator in the case ǫ = 10−6.
ask the person whose eyes have been stimulated by the superposition to write on
a piece of paper either A or B according to region from which he or she has seen
the luminous spot. This fact has to be taken present because it has an important
consequence: after the perception emerges other macroscopic changes are implied
by its specific character (having perceived a spot from A or from B) and such
changes are then frozen by the collapse mechanism which is active for all particles
of the universe. So, also in the present case, after the collapse corresponding to the
emergence of a definite perception, the reduction lasts practically forever.
8 The actual unfolding of the process of Section 7
We now present the results of the detailed analysis we have performed of the time behavior
of the statistical operator for the two considered choices of ǫ. We summarize our results in
a series of figures in which we have plotted ρ1(t) and ρ3(t) of Eq.(11) under the dynamics
(13). We start, in Fig.2, with the case in which ǫ is very small (10−6), like in actual
collapse processes involving macroscopic systems. The figure shows clearly (the dashed
and the dotted lines) that in a time of few hundredth of a second reduction takes place and
leads to the eigenstate σz = +1 with the correct quantum probability a
2 = 0.48 implied
by the form (9) of the initial state. The reduced state remains then unaltered for a quite
long time (≃ 109sec). Subsequently the asymptotic behaviour, i.e. the one corresponding
to a probability of 50% for the reduction to one of the eigenstates σz = ±1, emerges.
We pass now to discuss the most interesting case, i.e. the one in which ǫ is appreciably
increased (ǫ = 10−2). Figure 3 (pay attention to the change of scale of the abscissa) looks
similar to the previous one but there are some differences. They are not evident from Fig.
3 since use has been made of an inappropriate vertical scale. To put into evidence these
12
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Figure 3: The behavior of the statistical operator in the case ǫ = 10−2.
features, their relevance and to discuss their physical implications one has to amplify the
vertical scale. This has been done in Fig.4 which shows various relevant facts. First of
all, after the reduction has taken place (in a time of the order of 10−2 sec, as shown in
Fig.3), the function ρ1(t) exhibits a plateaux, lasting for about 6-7 seconds, before the
asymptotic regime emerges. The noticeable fact is that in this time interval (which, as
discussed before is sufficient for inducing other macroscopic changes which are then frozen
by the theory) the probability of the outcome σz = +1 amounts to more than 49%, i.e.
it differs from the one of 48% required by quantum mechanics. It seems that the fact
that the dynamical set up of the perceptions and the reductions due to the collapses
become competitive can lead to systematic perceptual discrepancies from the quantum
predictions.
9 A summary of the situation
Our analysis gives some clear indications about the perceptual process. If one assumes that
in the case in which one triggers the visual apparatus with states corresponding to definite
and different perceptions, randomly distributed with probabilities 48% and 52% between
“a spot at A” and “a spot at B” , no perceptual errors occur, the person subjected to
the test would give answers reproducing the considered distributions (actually one could
also check that in each individual process the perception matches the stimulus). On
the other hand, in the case in which one triggers the perceptual apparatus with a state
which is a superposition of the just mentioned states which should yield, according to
standard quantum theory, once more to a 48%-52% distribution, some systematic errors
seems to emerge, implying a violation of the quantum predictions. In a sense, one might
pictorially describe the situation by claiming that in the second case, the brain (or the
rods) has (have) to make the additional work of “reducing the state” and this might affect
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Figure 4: The vertically amplified behavior of the function ρ1(t) in the case ǫ = 10
−2.
systematically the occurrence of the outcomes. Our analysis gives some (extremely) vague
support to this idea and suggests that among the devised experiments to test collapse
models versus the standard theory, also experiments involving perceptual process might
and should be performed.
10 Rejecting a possible criticism
There is an aspect of the dynamical reduction mechanism which deserves further in-
vestigations. We have been led to the idea that when directly stimulated by a super-
position, the perceptual apparatus might yield distribution of outcomes (very slightly)
disagreeing with those implied by quantum mechanics. However, if the discrepancies
can be actually put into evidence, we must check that the newly suggested peculiar-
ity of the collapse models does not lead to consequences allowing faster than light ef-
fects. In fact, suppose the same effect, i.e. the enhancement of perceptions favoring “a
spot from A”, of triggering the perceptual apparatus with the state we have considered,
(a|10 photons from A〉+b|10 photons from B〉) occurs also in the case when one triggers
the apparatus with the orthogonal state a|10 photons from A〉 − b|10 photons from B〉,
while no perceptual mistake occur when triggering the apparatus with a state correspond-
ing to a definite perception (i.e. one of the two of the superposition). In such a case one
might entangle the spin states of our particle with states of a further physical system far
apart from the region in which the photons beams are, in the following way:
|Ψ >= 1√
2
{|χ1〉 ⊗ [a|A > +b|B >] + |χ2〉 ⊗ [a|A > −b|B >], (14)
where we have used the notation |A > for the state |10 photons from A〉 and |B > for
the state |10 photons from B〉, respectively. In this case, the guy, let us call him Bob,
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Figure 5: The proof that no faster than light effect can occur
who has access to the system whose states are |χ1 > and |χ2 > can choose whether to
measure an observable which has such states as eigenstates, leading then to reduction
to one of the states [a|A > ±|B >]. Alternatively, Bob might choose to measure an
observable having as eigenstates [|χ1 > ±|χ2 >] inducing then a reduction to either the
state |A > or to the state |B >. Then, the far away observer (Alice) would have his/her
perceptual apparatus triggered either by the states corresponding to definite perceptions
or by their superposition. However, if in the second case (reduction to any one of the
states [a|A > ±|B >]) the perceptual process of Alice would be affected in the same
way, Alice would perceive more outcomes corresponding to |A > with respect to those
implied by quantum mechanics and she might become aware (in the long run) of the
kind of measurements that Bob has decided to perform. Obviously, to avoid faster than
light effects, we must guarantee that this cannot happen. The request implies that the
perceptual errors associated to triggering Alice visual apparatus with the state in which
the sign of b is changed should compensate those for which no change has been performed.
We know that things must go in this way because there is a general proof [27] that collapse
theories do not imply superluminal effects. We have considered it useful to check this fact
also with reference to our toy model. In Fig.5 we have plotted the first term of the
statistical operator for three different initial conditions:
1. ρ1(t): the initial state is [
√
0.48|10 photons from A〉+i√0.52|10 photons from B〉],
2. ρ˜1(t): the initial state is [
√
0.48|10 photons from A〉−i√0.52|10 photons from B〉],
3. ρmix1 (t): the initial state is the statistical mixture, with weights 0.48 and 0.52 of the
states corresponding to definite perceptions associated to |10 photons from A〉 and
|10 photons from B〉.
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As it is evident, the function for the third case turns out to be precisely the average of
the first two cases. No superluminal signal can occur.
11 Conclusions
We have made plausible that, besides the various possible tests of collapse models versus
quantum mechanics, also resorting to specific processes involving the direct triggering of
the perceptual apparatus by a quantum superposition of microscopic states might help in
discriminating between these two descriptions of natural processes.
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